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results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while 
the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy- 
side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' 
underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal 
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suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their 
recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher 
analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial 
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Market efficiencyThere is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yieldsmixed
results.Weuse a large sample fromboth the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First,while
the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-
side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts'
underperformance is accentuatedwhen they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal
returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions,
suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their
recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have
higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is
substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest
that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in
the literature.1. Introduction
There is much research on the profitability of sell-side analysts'
recommendations. By contrast, there are only a few papers that
investigate the performance of buy-side analysts' recommendations.
Some of the more recent papers in this area have examined buy-side
performance in the context of sell-side behavior, but most use a lim-
ited sample, suffer from survivorship bias, or do not fully examine the
link between the buy and sell sides to quantify the part of institutions'
profit or loss that is incremental to analyst recommendations. In the
following study, we fill in this gap by examining a large sample of
survivorship-bias-free data from both sides of the market to measure
the profitability of buy-side analysts in four ways: (1) overall,
(2) cross-sectionally, (3) temporally (in terms of both absolute and rel-
ative persistence), and (4) with respect to changes in sell-side analyst
recommendations, to determine the relative value of the two sides'
behavior.
Howdo institutionsdecidewhich securities to buy andwhich to sell?
The final say goes to the fund manager, but fund managers (as well as
the investment committees that make trading recommendations to1 313 271 9837.
tsmala@umich.edu (V. Singh).their firms) are known to rely heavily on their analysts.2 It is under the
assumption that buy-side trading is influenced largely by buy-side
analyst recommendations that we use institutional portfolio data as
our proxy for buy-side analyst behavior. To the extent that institutional
investors have access to recommendations from sell-side analysts, one
could argue that our proxy is a dirtymeasure of buy-side analyst recom-
mendations. We agree with this argument and we address this concern
by concentrating on the buy-side analysts' induced institutional trades
that explicitly go against the recommendations of sell-side analysts for
much of our analysis. Additionally, by using the Thomson 13F dataset,
we restrict ourselves to using quarterly observations, whereas some
studies using proprietary data (see Frey & Herbst, 2014 or Crawford,
Gray, Johnson, & Price, 2012, both of which employ daily data) have ac-
cess to more detailed information on trading behavior, though for limit-
ed time periods. While we acknowledge that themain disadvantages of
our dataset and sample construction are not eliminated, we also have
the advantage of more comprehensively comparing sell-side and buy-
side analysts over a long period in a way that contains less selection-
or survivorship-bias than is present in much of the recent literature.
Although some evidence shows that institutional investors in
general and mutual funds in particular, and by extension the buy-side
analysts that they employ, do not generate positive abnormal returns2 Analysts are usually members of the investment committees.
and thus could be considered non-helpful (or downright harmful,
depending on the study) to investors,3 there is considerable evidence
that sell-side analysis is beneficial. Among others, Logue and Tuttle
(1973), Dimson and Marsh (1984), Elton, Gruber, and Grossman
(1986), Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman
(2001, 2003), and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find changes
in analysts' recommendations to be consistent with subsequent abnor-
mal stock returns. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) find that analyst recom-
mendations are profitable, particularly for those analysts based in the
U.S., while Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) find recommendations to
contain profitable information extending beyond other variables that
are related to future returns. Despite the evidence in support of sell-
side analysts, there are also papers that document some problems, usu-
ally stemming from optimism bias or conflicts of interest, with analyst
recommendations. Both Lin and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and
Womack (1999) document such conflicts; for example, the latter
study finds that underwriter analysts exhibit significant optimism
bias for those stocks that they've underwritten. Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2014)find that strategic optimismbias (the bias created
by conflicts of interest) appears to be intentional, widespread, and eco-
nomically substantial. Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree (2006)
find that optimism bias is also related to past events and is reflected in
the asymmetric response of analysts to the directions of large stock
pricemoves in the past. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that analyst recom-
mendation levels relate positively to future returns only for those stocks
with upwardmomentumor contrarian characteristics. Additionally, the
authors find that analyst recommendation levels relate inversely to fu-
ture returns for other stocks in their dataset. Last, Altinkilic and Hansen
(2009) and Altinkilic, Balashov, and Hansen (2013) find that revisions
to analyst recommendations are typically reactive rather than predic-
tive and thus are of little trading value to investors.
In addition to the evidence regarding aggregate performance, there
are also well-documented cross-sectional differences between stock
analysts. Analyst performance has been tied to the accuracy of earnings
forecasts (Ertimur, Sunder, & Sunder, 2007 and Loh &Mian, 2006), past
performance (Fang & Yasuda, 2009 and Loh & Stulz, 2011), the frequen-
cy of recommendation revisions (Hobbs, Kovacs, & Sharma, 2012),
and incentive distortions caused by investment banking affiliations
(Barber, Lehavy, & Trueman, 2007).
Many recent studies have compared buy-side profitability to sell-
side recommendations to obtain a clearer picture of the overall process
of institutional trading. Althoughmuch of this research uses proprietary
data from other parts of the buy-side previously ignored by the mutual
fund studies, they often use limited datasets and yield differing results.
Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2006) find that funds rely more on buy-side re-
search than on sell-side or independent research, and that abnormal
returns increase in buy-side reliance and experience. These funds also
value buy-side researchmorewhen the sell-side focuses on small stocks
or has larger forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Kacperczyk and
Seru (2007) report that the funds that have more skilled managers
tend to prefer private (buy-side) information to public (sell-side)3 The research on the investment performance of institutions (the “buy-side”) dates
back to Jensen (1968) and continues throughwell-known studies by Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992), Carhart (1997), Fama and French (2008), and Busse et al. (2010),
among others. There is some debate over how much of the persistence in performance
(good or bad) is attributable to the momentum effect of stocks remaining in their respec-
tivemutual funds after those funds have been designatedwinners or losers on the basis of
the past performance of those same stocks. Carhart (1997), Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers
(2009), and Fama and French (2008) show very little (if any) persistence or predictability
in the performance of mutual funds that is incremental to the momentum effect of the
stocks in them. However, Berk and Xu (2007), Bollen and Busse (2005), Cohen, Coval,
and Pastor (2005), Avramov and Wermers (2006), and Kosowski, Timmermann,
Wermers, and White (2006) all find evidence that mutual fund performance is to some
degree predictable. Binay (2005) uses Thomson 13F holdings data and finds that while
mutual funds do not trade profitably, other institutional investors do. Chen et al. (2000),
however, use 13F quarterly holdings data to find some evidence of mutual fund trading
success.information. Similarly, Frey and Herbst (2014), using a sample from
one firm, find that fund trading is driven more by buy-side recommen-
dations than by sell-side recommendations or fund flows, and that
those trades that are triggered by buy-side recommendations yield the
highest excess returns. Last, Crawford et al. (2012) use data from an
invitation-only, Facebook-style event and conclude that buy-side rec-
ommendations do have investment value, particularly for firms with
small capitalizations and high book-to-market ratios.
In contrast, Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim, Shanthikumar, and Gui
(2010) compare buy-siders at one large firm to sell-siders on I/B/E/S
and conclude that buy-side recommendations are less optimistic,
owing to fewer conflicts of interest, and interestingly are less profitable.
However, the authors attribute this lower profitability to the fact that
buy-siders recommend larger firms, on average, than do sell-siders.
Similarly, Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012) examine a more compre-
hensive sample of buy- and sell-side activities and find that sell-side an-
alyst recommendations are profitable while buy-side activity is largely
alpha-neutral. The authors conclude that institutional trading offers no
incremental value to sell-side stock recommendations. There are at
least two shortcomings of the papers that rely on limited samples.
First, the data are often provided by the institutions themselves and,
as Busse et al. (2012) point out, survivorship bias plagues much of the
buy-side research. Second, although some of these studies report that
buy-side analysts generate superior recommendations, much of the
research finds that the typical institution that hires buy-side analysts
does not generate positive abnormal returns. This paper addresses
these issues. In particular, we attempt to provide amore comprehensive
understanding of the link between buy-side and sell-side analysts along
three dimensions. First, we examine the nature of buy-side induced in-
stitutional trading and sell-side analyst recommendations individually
with respect to the same-quarter movements of those stocks. Second,
we examine the behavior of the two sides with respect to one another
in the context of the stocks that they trade or recommend. Third, we
examine the persistence of performance among buy-side analysts. We
believe that our approach offers new evidence, from a more compre-
hensive dataset including different types of institutions as well as ana-
lyst recommendations, on all of these important topics.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data andmethods that we use. Section 3 addresses the topic of buy- and
sell-side behaviors individually and with respect to one another.
Section 4 investigates the issue of persistence. Section 5 concludes the
study.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Sample data
Our institutional (“buy-side”) data come from the Thomson Finan-
cial 13-F filings. These filings include information on the quarterly
stock holdings, beginning in the first quarter of 1994, of all financial in-
stitutions that manage more than $100 million in securities.4 Although
only equity positions of more than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in
market capitalization are required to be reported, many institutions
voluntarily provide data on all of their holdings. We then examine the
changes in these buy-side investment portfolios over 64 quarters,
from the first quarter of 1994 through the fourth quarter of 2009. We
use the Institutional Brokers' Estimates System (hereafter denoted
“IBES”) to gather our analyst recommendation (“sell-side”) data over
the sameperiod.Wematch the 8-character CUSIP variable in the detailed
recommendation file in IBES to that in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (“CRSP”, hereafter) database and then use the 6-character CUSIP if4 The start of the data period is dictated by the IBES detailed recommendation files (re-
quired to infer buy-side recommendations), whose first complete year of data begins in
1994.
5 We also use amore liberal 10% increase to proxy for seasoned equity offerings. It does
not materially affect our results.that fails to produce a match. Our sample excludes ADRs (American
Depositary Receipts), SBI (Shares of Beneficial Interest), Units (Deposito-
ryUnits, Units of Beneficial Interest, Units of Limited Partnership Interest,
Depository Receipts, etc.), REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts), and
closed-end mutual funds. For both the buy-side and the sell-side, we
do not censor or winsorize any of the variables in our dataset.
2.2. Classifying buy-side behavior
For each quarter, we infer buy-side analyst activity by observing the
information-based trading done by the institution that employs the
analyst. Specifically, if a stock is bought (sold) by the institution, we
assume that the affiliated buy-side analyst(s) must have upgraded
(downgraded) that stock in the same quarter. The exact procedure to
identify stocks that are upgraded (downgraded) by the analysts is
outlined as follows. First we identify for each institutional investor
whether each stock is bought (sold) in a quarter by measuring the
change in its holding in the same quarter. Since institutional investors
do not buy or sell a stock due to informational reasons only, we employ
several adjustments to ensure that our identification of trades is not
contaminated by othermotives for institutional trading. Thefirst adjust-
ments control for the return on the existing holding of stock i and
the net flow of funds to the institutional investor during the current
quarter, t. For each quarter, we use the following formula, which was
inspired by Barber, Odean, and Zhang (2005), and Griffin, Harris, Shu,
and Topaloglu (2011), to determine whether for each stock i in quarter
t an institutional investor K is a buyer (Inst(i,t) is positive) or a seller
(Inst(i,t) is negative).
Inst i; tð Þ ¼ Si;tPi;t−Si;t−1Pi;t−1 1þ rð Þ
Si;t−1Pi;t−1
−
XN¼m
i¼1
Si;tPi;t−
XN¼m
i¼1
Si;tPi;t−1 1þ rð Þ
XN¼m
i¼1
Si;t−1Pi;t−1
An institution K that is a net buyer (seller) of stock i in quarter t will
yield a positive (negative) value for the above expression. In other
words a positive (negative) value is consistent with buy-side analysts
upgrading (downgrading) the stock in the same quarter. Si,t and Si,t−1
are the number of shares held by institutional investor K in stock i at
the end of quarters t and t−1 respectively. Pi,t and Pi,t−1 are the share
price of stock i at the end of quarters t and t−1, respectively. The return
on stock i in the current quarter t is captured by r. Thus the first term in
the expression in (2) represents net buying or selling in stock i in quar-
ter t by institutional investor K as a fraction of its initial holding of the
stock, adjusted for the return on stock i in the current quarter. The sec-
ond term represents the net buying or selling by the same institution
across all stocks traded in quarter t. If institutional investor K faces an in-
flow (outflow) of funds in quarter t, we expect the second term to be
positive (negative). Therefore this expression measures, for each stock
in each quarter, the buying or selling that is in excess of the net flow
of funds to institutional investor K. We also adjust the share holdings
and prices for outside factors that affect the number of shares, such as
stock splits and stock dividends.
Further, we construct the following filters to ensure that our results
based on Inst(i,t) are unaffected by trades that occurred for non-
information-based reasons. For example, as a new stock comes to the
market via an initial public offering in a given quarter, most institutional
investors will be net buyers. To correct for this problem, we consider
Inst(i,t) for only those stocks that had also existed in the previous quarter,
t−1. For similar reasons, we exclude Inst(i,t) for those cases in which a
stock ceases to exist because of a merger, acquisition, delisting etc.
Similar to IPOs, seasoned equity offerings may also affect Inst(i,t).
We assume that if the number of shares outstanding (adjusted for
stock splits, stock dividends, etc.) for a stock has increased by more
than 25% from the previous quarter, then the firm has had a potentialseasoned equity offering in the current quarter.5 We remove such
stock-quarters from our final sample.
Because the performance of many institutions is benchmarked
against stock market indexes, part of the institutional trading in stocks
may be explained by indexing. To remove the potentially confounding
effect of indexing on our results, we eliminate all Inst(i,t) that are affect-
ed by additions and deletions to the S&P 500 index during the sample
period. In order to do this we download a file containing all additions
and deletions to the S&P 500 index from Professor Jeffrey Wurgler's
website. This file contains each stock's company identifier, addition or
deletion flag, and the announcement date and effective date for its addi-
tion to (or deletion from) the index, among other variables. If the institu-
tional trading in a stock is related to that stock's addition to (or deletion
from) the S&P 500 index, we expect most of the trading to occur around
the quarter of the addition/deletion.We determine the quarter and year
of the addition or deletion for all stocks in this sample using the effective
date and then merge it with our sample of stocks. We exclude from our
sample all stock-quarters in which additions or deletions occurred.
We acknowledge that although we make attempts to identify
information-driven trades only and use the above-mentioned filters,
we may be misclassifying some trades that are driven by other motives
such as managerial risk shifting due to differential performance across
parts of the year because of compensation incentives, employment
risk motives or economic activity (Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; Brown,
Harlow, & Starks, 1996; Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Kempf, Ruenzi, and
Thiele, 2009; Pagani, Hu, Kale, and Subramanian, 2011; Olivier and
Tay, 2009). Similarly some trading could be attributed to herding
(Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger & Sias, 1999;
Wermers, 1999). Some tradingmay also be related toWindow dressing
and tax-loss selling (Sias, 2007).
2.3. Classifying sell-side analyst behavior
To determine whether a stock was upgraded or downgraded by
sell-side analysts in a quarter, we measure the change in the consensus
recommendation at the end of each quarter using the IBES detailed
analyst recommendation files. To compute the consensus recommenda-
tion for a stock, we use all outstanding recommendations by all analysts
that are less than one year old, per Jegadeesh et al. (2004). We focus on
upgrades anddowngrades rather than on overall levels since the change
in recommendations has been found to be more informative than the
level of those recommendations (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Additionally,
prior research shows that analysts issue optimistic recommendations
in the year that a stock first comes to the market. To mitigate the influ-
ence of this bias in analyst recommendations, we remove any recom-
mendation that is issued within one year from the date that a firm
went public.
2.4. Methods
Our examination of buy-side analysts is based on their institutions'
portfolios of stocks, whose abnormal returns we derive by estimating
time-series regressions of the contemporaneous and subsequent
quarter's excess return as benchmarked against the CAPM, Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor
model. For sell-side analysts, we simply examine the abnormal perfor-
mance of portfolios of stocks upgraded or downgraded as implied by
the change in those analysts' recommendations. We use aggregate per-
formance rather than a typical sell-side analyst's performance because
there is much research indicating that the typical sell-side analyst gen-
erates positive alpha. However, the issue of aggregate buy-side analyst
performance is far from settled. In addition, it could be argued that the
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
The table below reports some of the main features of our sample. The sample period is
from the first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2009. We derive buy-side analyst data
from the changes in quarterly institutional holding data for eachmanager reported in 13F
as detailed in the text, and sell-side analyst data from the IBES detailed recommendation
files. We determine whether a stock was upgraded or downgraded by sell-side analysts
(which results in a “change in consensus recommendation”) for the end of each quarter.
To compute the consensus recommendation for a stock, we average all outstanding ana-
lyst recommendations that are less than one year old. In Panel Awe report the distribution
of upgrades, downgrades, and non-changes for buy-side and sell-side analysts in a typical
quarter. In Panel B we report the size of the portfolio managed by a typical fund manager
and turnover classified by the category of institution. The portfolio turnover is computed
for each manager in each quarter per the formula given in the CRSP files.
Panel A: Buy-side and sell-side analysts' recommendation changes
Trade/recommendation Buy-side analysts'
recommendations
Sell-side analysts'
recommendations
Buy/upgrade 50.04% 39.72%
No change N/A 24.37%
Sell/downgrade 49.96% 35.90%
Panel B: Managers' portfolio sizes and turnover
Type of
institution
# of
unique
managers
Portfolio size
(in millions of dollars)
Portfolio turnover
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Banks 354 8470 8593 3087 23.7 20.4 8.1
Insurance
firms
111 8465 8953 2607 31.0 29.0 10.3
Mutual
funds
139 25,781 25,308 13,809 43.9 39.6 14.5
Brokerage 2298 2537 2472 793 37.5 33.6 10.9
Others 2027 3218 2183 2885 30.0 30.3 6.2
All 3931 4173 922 35.6 31.5 9.8buy-side benefits from the research of sell-side analysts. In some of the
following sections of this paper these abnormal returns will be contem-
poraneouswith the behavior of buy-side analysts, and in other caseswe
compute them subsequent to the quarter in which the behavior occurs.
For each section, we clarify whether the returns that we examine are
contemporaneous or subsequent. In some tables we also provide abnor-
mal returns for the first and last months of the contemporaneous
quarters. We alternatively compute quarterly abnormal returns using
the CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart
(1997) four-factor model as our benchmarks. In all cases, we use
monthly returns data as the basis for these calculations. We download
the factors from Kenneth French's website. For example, to compute
the buy-side analysts' upgraded stocks' abnormal returns, we first iden-
tity the stocks upgraded/downgraded as detailed above and then form
an equally-weighted and a value-weighted portfolio of those stocks.
We then regress the excess returns of these two portfolios on the factors
prescribed under the CAPM, Fama–French three-factor model, and
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. For instance, to determine the four-
factor abnormal return of an equally-weighted portfolio of upgraded
stocks for buy-side analyst “i”, we regress his or her portfolio's quarterly
excess return on the three factors of Fama and French (1993) and the
momentum factor in Carhart (1997) as follows: ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi
(rm,t − rf,t) + γi (smbt) + δi (hmlt) + ωi (momt) + εi,t, where ri,t −rf,t
is the excess return of equally-weighted portfolios of stocks upgraded
by analyst i over the risk-free rate in quarter t; the first factor, rm,
t − rf,t (or RMRFt) denotes the return in excess of the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks over the
three-month T-bill yield in quarter t; the second factor, smbt, is the
difference between the returns of small and large capitalization
stocks in quarter t; the third factor, hmlt, is the difference between
the returns of high and low book-to-market stocks in quarter t; and
the fourth factor, momt, is the difference between the returns of
stocks with high and low recent returns in quarter t. The intercept
of the above time-series regressions is analyst i's alpha or abnormal
return. Following a similar procedure, we compute an analyst's
Fama–French three-factor and CAPM abnormal returns. We then
compute the alpha for analyst i's downgraded stocks as well as for
a zero-investment portfolio that goes long in analyst i's upgraded
stock and short in his or her downgraded stocks. We repeat the en-
tire analysis for value-weighted portfolios. Our analysis of the invest-
ment performance of buy-side analysts is based on the cross-
sectional mean of analysts' abnormal returns as calculated above.
For sell-side analysts, we simply compute the alpha for portfolios
of stocks that were upgraded or downgraded in a particular quarter
as indicated by the change in the sell-side analysts' consensus rec-
ommendations. As we did with buy-side analysts, we form zero-
investment portfolios by going long in upgraded and short in
downgraded stocks. The analysis is again conducted for both equal-
ly-weighted and value-weighted portfolios using the CAPM, Fama–
French three-factor, and Carhart four-factor models.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. When do buy-side analysts and sell-side analysts change
recommendations?
3.1.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of institutions
and analysts. Not surprisingly, the distribution among institutions is
fairly even between purchases and sales, as is the distribution among
sell-side analysts between recommendation upgrades and downgrades.
Panel B gives a further breakdown of the managers, portfolio sizes, and
portfolio turnover for our subsample of institutions. Though there is a
far greater number of managers within the brokerage firm and “all
other” subgroups, the highest turnover and largest portfolios belong to
the mutual fund subgroup. While the turnover numbers are expectedgiven the incentives that prevail within the mutual fund industry, it
should be noted that multiple mutual funds within the same company
are aggregated, thus the extremely high portfolio sizes shown for that
subgroup of institution.
3.1.2. Buy-side analysts' recommendations and the performance of
institutional portfolios
We now examine the contemporaneous returns, benchmarked
against the CAPM, Fama–French three-factor, and Carhart four-factor
models, of portfolios formed on the basis of institutional trading. We
use institutional trading as a proxy for buy-side analyst behavior. The
results in Table 2 are interesting: portfolios of stocks downgraded
by buy-side analysts outperform the three benchmarks in the same
quarter, while portfolios of stocks upgraded by buy-side analysts
underperform those benchmarks. All of these results are highly signifi-
cant. Although the underperformance is stronger for equally-weighted
portfolios, the value-weighted portfolios are only marginally better.
Given the nature of our data it is difficult to say for sure whether buy-
side upgrades/downgrades on average lead, lag or occur at roughly
the same time that the institutional portfolios are generating such ex-
cess returns. However, it is notable that for downgraded stocks, which
make up the majority of the overall abnormal return to institutions,
the highest returns occur in the first month of the quarter (we do not
report returns for the second month, but they can be inferred from
the rest of the results), and are much higher than in the third month.
However, the returns in the first and last months are the sign that is
consistent with the quarterly returns for downgraded and upgraded
stocks. These results suggest that the recommendations of buy-side
analysts are harmful to the portfolios of the institutional traders that
they advise.
An alternative explanation is that buy-side analysts have a longer
investment horizon than do sell-side analysts or they are contrarian
investors, and therefore one should examine the abnormal returns
Table 2
Profitability of portfolios constructed from contemporaneous changes in buy-side analysts' recommendations.
The table below reports the quarterly contemporaneous and one quarter ahead abnormal returns of stocks upgraded and downgraded by buy-side analysts. The sample period is from the
first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2009.We infer buy-side analysts' recommendations from the changes in quarterly institutional holding data for eachmanager reported in 13F as
detailed in the text. We obtain the quarterly excess returns by regressing the equally-weighted and value-weighted excess returns of each institution's upgraded or downgraded stocks'
portfolios on the excess returns from the Carhart 4-factor model, Fama–French 3-factor model, and CAPM, all downloaded from Kenneth French's website. We report the intercepts from
these regressions below. We report t-statistics in parentheses.
Mean quarterly and monthly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios downgraded and upgraded by buy-side analysts (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Downgraded 1.98
(33.67)
0.79
(30.21)
0.38
(19.83)
0.26
(8.30)
1.55
(30.37)
0.93
(34.25)
0.08
(4.50)
−0.11
(−3.68)
1.41
(26.06)
0.73
(29.60)
0.30
(13.15)
−0.08
(−2.34)
Upgraded −0.33
(−6.90)
−0.17
(−7.76)
−0.10
(−5.06)
0.59
(18.35)
−0.64
(−13.25)
−0.06
(−2.72)
−0.38
(−18.56)
0.19
(6.91)
−0.73
(−14.82)
−0.20
(−9.10)
−0.21
(−9.48)
0.15
(4.62)
Upgraded minus
downgraded
−2.12
(–26.79)
−0.89
(−25.01)
−0.44
(−17.62)
0.30
(9.07)
−2.01
(−26.35)
−0.91
(−25.02)
−0.42
(−16.09)
0.27
(8.37)
−1.97
(−24.92)
−0.86
(−24.52)
−0.47
(−15.42)
0.20
(5.24)
Mean quarterly and monthly abnormal returns of value-weighted portfolios downgraded and upgraded by buy-side analysts (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Downgraded 1.13
(22.89)
0.71
(30.52)
0.07
(3.96)
−0.22
(−7.66)
1.10
(24.91)
0.68
(27.76)
0.23
(12.22)
−0.21
(−7.51)
0.95
(20.40)
0.63
(28.04)
0303
(1.22)
−0.22
(−6.66)
Upgraded −0.85
(−19.56)
−0.22
(−10.06)
−0.26
(13.15)
−0.01
(−0.45)
−0.80
(−18.11)
−0.25
(−11.61)
−0.11
(−5.21)
−0.03
(−1.11)
−0.87
(−18.89)
−0.28
(−12.71)
−0.30
(−13.30)
−0.07
(−2.26)
Upgraded minus
downgraded
−1.82
(−26.20)
−0.83
(−25.61)
−0.30
(−11.97)
0.19
(5.55)
−1.75
(−26.21)
−0.85
(−25.42)
−0.31
(−11.73)
0.15
(4.67)
−1.68
(−24.40)
−0.84
(−25.92)
−0.25
(−8.07)
0.12
(3.18)from the following quarter as well. These returns, though positive, are
tiny compared to the negative returns from the previous quarter, and
are in fact smaller than those of just the previous month. Moreover,
those positive subsequent-quarter returns may owe in part to priceTable 3
Profitability of portfolios constructed from contemporaneous changes in sell-side analysts' reco
The table below reports the quarterly contemporaneous and one quarter ahead abnormal retur
first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2009. We extract the sell-side analysts' data from t
downgraded by sell-side analysts (which results in a “change in consensus recommendation”
average all outstanding analyst recommendations that are less than one year old. We obtain th
returns of each institution's upgraded or downgraded stocks' portfolios on the excess returns f
from Kenneth French's website. We report the intercepts from these regressions below. We re
Mean quarterly and monthly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios downgrade
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French ab
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly Fi
m
Downgraded −3.72
(−5.17)
−1.58
(−3.13)
−1.40
(−4.24)
−0.28
(−0.35)
−4.28
(−11.97)
−
(−
No change 0.91
(1.14)
0.28
(0.52)
0.49
(1.33)
0.39
(0.47)
0.28
(0.94)
0.
(3
Upgraded 4.85
(5.94)
1.60
(3.64)
1.53
(5.47)
1.00
(1.65)
4.22
(10.09)
2.
(8
Upgraded minus
downgraded
8.56
(14.59)
3.19
(11.42)
2.93
(12.38)
1.28
(3.66)
8.50
(14.27)
3.
(1
Mean quarterly and monthly abnormal returns of value-weighted portfolios downgraded
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French ab
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly Fi
m
Downgraded −1.92
(−10.52)
−0.56
(−4.76)
−0.81
(−7.82)
0.20
(0.85)
−1.87
(−10.68)
−
(−
No change 0.19
(0.61)
−0.43
(−2.45)
0.43
(2.24)
−0.43
(−1.22)
0.13
(0.49)
−
(−
Upgraded 1.96
(9.70)
0.72
(6.03)
0.76
(4.85)
−0.31
(1.46)
1.92
(9.60)
0.
(5
Upgraded minus
downgraded
3.88
(10.76)
1.29
(5.67)
1.58
(7.29)
−0.51
(−1.37)
3.79
(10.68)
1.
(5pressure caused by portfolio rebalancing in response to the negative
returns occurring in the quarter before. Based on all of this, it seems
unlikely that the alternative explanation outlined above can explain
the underperformance of institutional trading.mmendations.
ns of stocks upgraded and downgraded by sell-side analysts. The sample period is from the
he IBES detailed recommendation files. We determine whether a stock was upgraded or
) for the end of each quarter. To compute the consensus recommendation for a stock, we
e quarterly excess returns by regressing the equally-weighted and value-weighted excess
rom the Carhart 4-factor model, Fama–French 3-factor model, and CAPM, all downloaded
port t-statistics in parentheses.
d and upgraded by sell-side analysts (%) (t-statistic)
normal return Carhart abnormal return
rst
onth
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
0.99
3.18)
−1.99
(−7.74)
−0.92
(−2.79)
−3.93
(−9.93)
−1.28
(−6.08)
−1.08
(−4.46)
−0.67
(−1.79)
97
.62)
−0.16
(−0.73)
−0.25
(−0.74)
0.27
(0.79)
0.75
(3.63)
0.36
(1.41)
−0.00
(−0.1)
10
.10)
1.00
(4.96)
0.50
(2.30)
3.97
(8.41)
1.87
(9.94)
1.30
(5.37)
0.38
(1.54)
09
1.29)
3.00
(11.97)
1.42
(4.47)
7.90
(12.01)
3.15
(11.46)
2.38
(8.62)
1.05
(2.98)
and upgraded by sell-side analysts (%) (t-statistic)
normal return Carhart abnormal return
rst
onth
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
0.60
5.00)
−0.84
(−7.77)
0.10
(0.48)
−1.86
(−9.36)
−0.63
(−5.30)
−0.57
(−4.81)
0.37
(1.68)
0.33
1.97)
0.22
(1.41)
−0.55
(−1.69)
−0.10
(−0.33)
−0.27
(−1.64)
−0.17
(−1.01)
−0.59
(−1.57)
71
.75)
0.81
(5.03)
−0.24
(−1.20)
1.85
(8.13)
0.73
(5.84)
0.72
(3.63)
−0.40
(−1.78)
30
.58)
1.65
(7.19)
−0.34
(−1.03)
3.71
(9.19)
1.36
(5.78)
1.29
(4.75)
−0.77
(−2.17)
3.1.3. Changes in sell-side analyst recommendations and the performance
of their portfolios
As shown in Table 3, the contemporaneous performance of portfoli-
os constructed from changes in sell-side recommendations is very
different from that of portfolios constructed in accordance with institu-
tional trading. Sell-side analysts' portfolios perform profitably. When
analysts downgrade, the same-quarter excess returns to those stocks
are significantly negative, andwhen they upgrade, the excess returns
are significantly positive. We also observe that the quarterly alphas
are quite large. This is the case for both equally-weighted and
value-weighted portfolios, and the results hold for the Carhart four-
factor as well as Fama–French three-factor and CAPM benchmarks.
What is also interesting to note is that unlike the intra-quarter buy-
side returns, the returns to the sell-side are, on average, evenly distrib-
uted throughout the three months. We revisit this result in the next
section of this study, inwhichwe compare the performance of portfolios
consistent with contemporaneous buy- and sell-side recommendation
activities. Last, the returns in the following quarter remain positive for
equally-weighted portfolios and are negative but relatively small for
value-weighted portfolios. This, along with the same-quarter results,
suggests that sell-side analysts enjoy a greater advantage within the
domain of small-cap stocks, and that their overall advantage against
buy-side analysts persists through the following quarter.
3.1.4. Institutional trading for different types of analyst behavior
One could argue that institutions rely on sell-side analysts in addi-
tion to their own analysts when they consider making trades. If this is
the case, then the underperformance of institutional portfolios may
not be entirely attributable to those buy-side analysts. To tease out the
performance that could be ascribed to buy-side analysts, we segment
the institutional portfolios into portfolios that are consistent with
sell-side analysts' recommendations and portfolios that trade against
sell-side analysts' recommendations. We also create a group for the
cases in which institutions traded in a quarter when sell-side analysts
collectively did not change their consensus recommendation. We
argue that institutional portfolios that are inconsistent with sell-side
analyst recommendation changes offer us the cleanest sample where
we can isolate the effect of buy-side analysts' recommendations. Specif-
ically, we examine the relative performance of portfolios of stocks
which were bought by institutions (presumably at the behest of buy-
side analysts) but which were downgraded by sell-side analysts at the
same time. Similarly, we examine the performance of portfolios of
stocks thatwere sold by institutions (at the behest of buy-side analysts)
but which were simultaneously upgraded by sell-side analysts.
In Table 4, we report the contemporaneous excess returns for port-
folios when institutions trade, conditional on the behavior of sell-side
analysts. Panel A examines the case where institutional trading is
done in the opposite direction of the change in the analysts' consensus
recommendation (either institutions are net buyers in the same quarter
that sell-side analysts downgrade the stock or institutions are net
sellers in the same quarter that sell-side analysts upgrade the
stock). In this situation, the portfolios generate statistical and economic
underperformance of a severe magnitude for both upgraded and
downgraded stocks. The difference between the equally-weighted and
value-weighted portfolios suggests that much of this result is concen-
trated in smaller stocks, but there are very high levels of significance
for the value-weighted portfolio returns as well. In comparison to
Table 2, the underperformance is far more significant and consistent
with the idea that buy-side analyst recommendations are harmful to
the interests of institutional investors. Moreover, the abnormal returns
in Table 4 are fairly uniform across the three months of the quarter and
are highly significant, both economically and statistically, everywhere.
Because the negative “alpha” is not concentrated in the first month
and moreover remains substantially negative in the third month
(−1.2% to–1.7%), we can say with a fair degree of certainty that institu-
tional investors do not appear to employ a systematic, contrarianapproach of buying stocks after they have decreased in value or selling
stocks after they have increased in value.Moreover, some researchfinds
that it is the buy-side that tends to follow the sell-side rather than the
other way around; institutional trading is often done in response to
changes in analyst recommendations (Busse et al., 2012). All of this
suggests that contrarianism is not a primary, or perhaps even signifi-
cant, reason for why institutions trade stocks. Further, the reversal
seen in the following month is, as in Table 2, miniscule in relation to
the abnormal return from the previous quarter, and nonexistent for
value-weighted “up-minus-down” portfolios. This suggests that differ-
ential investment horizons between buy-side and sell-side analysts
are not likely to be a key factor in our results. The evidence instead
indicates that on balance, institutional trades that contradict sell-side
analyst recommendations are unprofitable.
Panel B reports the contemporaneous abnormal market returns for
the casewhere institutions trade stocks forwhich there is no concurrent
change in the consensus sell-side analyst recommendation. Here again
the underperformance is significant at least on a within-quarter basis.
When institutions buy, the returns on the stocks that they buy are
negative and in most cases significant, and when institutions sell,
those stocks' returns are positive and highly significant. Although
zero-investment portfolios long in upgraded and short in downgraded
stocks show significant underperformance, the primary culprit seems
to be the group of downgraded stocks. We do not observe much differ-
ence between the abnormal returns of the value- and equally-weighted
portfolios. For this subset of trades, the returns are smaller (in absolute
value) in the third month of the quarter, but are still significantly
negative, suggesting that at least some of the overall negative return
probably succeeds the trade. These results contrast somewhat with
earlier studies by Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) and Binay
(2005) which also use Thomson 13F holdings data. In addition, the
existence of a “reversal” (to the extent that there is one) in the following
quarter is relatively small.
Panel C addresses the case where institutions trade in accordance
with concurrent changes in the sell-side consensus recommendation.
Here the results are opposite those in Panels A and B; institutions gener-
ally sell stocks that are falling and buy stocks that are rising, adding to
the positive abnormal returns to their portfolios overall. The results
are somewhat uniform across the three months of the quarter. This
indicates that while buy-side analysts' recommendations lead to the
underperformance of institutional portfolios, this underperformance is
mitigated a bit when their recommendations are in agreement with
revisions made by sell-side analysts. However, it also could be argued
that buy-side analysts' contribution to institutional profitability is most
visible when they go against sell-side analysts' recommendations. In
addition, buy-side trading is likely a better proxy for buy-side analyst
behavior when the trades contradict what sell-side analysts are saying
than when they do not. For these reasons, in our subsequent analysis
we focus on the subset of buy-side trades that go against sell-side
analysts' recommendations in order to explore other aspects of buy-
side analysts' performance.
3.1.5. Excess stock returns and institutional portfolio characteristics
Our results indicate that portfolios built from buy-side recommen-
dations contemporaneously underperform the market. Thus, it is likely
that a typical buy-side analyst most likely harms the performance of
the institution for which he or she works. However, it is additionally
important to examine whether there are cross-sectional differences in
the abilities of buy-side analysts. For example, it may be revealing to
examine the contemporaneous returns of the portfolios of stocks traded
by large institutions (as proxied by portfolio size) based on the possibil-
ity that larger institutions are able to hiremore competent analysts than
smaller institutions. There could also be cross-sectional differences
between analysts with regard to portfolio turnover; it might be the case
that more competent analysts issue recommendations more (or less)
frequently than do less competent analysts. Some of the cross-sectional
Table 4
Contemporaneous profitability of portfolios constructed from changes in buy-side analysts' recommendations conditioned on changes in sell-side recommendations.
This table reports the quarterly contemporaneous and one quarter ahead excess returns of portfolios of stocks upgraded and downgraded by buy-side analysts conditioned on what sell-side
analysts do in the same time period.We confine our sample to the stocks that are covered by both buy-side and sell-side analysts in each quarter. The sample period is from the first quarter of
1994 to the last quarter of 2009.We infer buy-side analysts' recommendations from the changes in quarterly institutional holding data for eachmanager reported in 13F as detailed in the text.
We extract sell-side analyst data from the IBES detailed recommendation files. To determine whether a stockwas upgraded or downgraded by sell-side analysts in a quarter, we compute the
change in the consensus recommendation at the end of each quarter by averaging all analysts' outstanding recommendations that are less than one year old.Weobtain quarterly excess returns
by regressing the equally-weighted andvalue-weighted excess returns of each institution's upgraded/downgraded stocks on the Carhart four-factor, Fama–French three-factor andexcessmar-
ket returns, all downloaded from Kenneth French's website. The intercepts from these regressions are reported below (t-statistics are in parentheses).
Panel A: Mean quarterly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when the sell-side consensus analyst recommendation
simultaneously changes in the opposite direction (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down 4.63
(71.36)
1.93
(61.42)
1.28
(56.86)
0.15
(4.28)
4.19
(70.77)
2.01
(60.33)
−1.27
(−49.74)
−0.05
(−1.45)
3.86
(61.55)
−1.10
(−37.04)
−0.88
(−31.59)
−0.19
(−4.90)
Up −2.65
(−41.82)
−1.05
(−35.26)
−1.00
(−42.23)
0.57
(16.56)
−2.88
(−44.32)
−0.96
(−32.85)
1.02
(45.34)
0.12
(3.78)
−2.91
(−43.43)
1.82
(60.19)
1.05
(36.11)
0.12
(3.43)
Up
minus down
−6.19
(−30.46)
−2.16
(−49.06)
−1.68
(−56.07)
0.32
(9.28)
−6.00
(−59.89)
−2.17
(−48.92)
−1.70
(−53.98)
0.11
(3.37)
−5.74
(−56.67)
−2.14
(−49.74)
−1.42
(−42.50)
0.23
(5.83)
Mean quarterly abnormal returns of value-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when the sell-side consensus analyst recommendation simultaneously
changes in the opposite direction (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down 1.87
(32.82)
1.48
(51.29)
0.97
(44.00)
0.06
(1.23)
1.72
(8.62)
−0.81
(−29.60)
−0.89
(−35.21)
−0.03
(−0.73)
1.32
(22.90)
−0.89
(−32.23)
−0.62
(−22.24)
−0.12
(−2.17)
Up 0.01
(0.14)
−0.79
(−28.26)
−0.96
(−41.27)
−0.02
(−0.40)
−0.12
(−2.36)
1.46
(46.99)
1.04
(46.05)
−0.14
(−3.40)
−0.38
(−6.99)
1.44
(50.61)
1.01
(34.99)
−0.23
(−4.66)
Up minus down −1.54
(−35.69)
−1.62
(−43.53)
−1.41
(−50.43)
−0.07
(−1.49)
−1.51
(−24.84)
−1.64
(−43.29)
−1.42
(−48.53)
−0.06
(−1.22)
−1.43
(−19.30)
−1.68
(−45.80)
−1.20
(−37.56)
−0.05
(−0.95)
Panel B: Mean quarterly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when there is no corresponding change in sell-side analysts'
consensus recommendation (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down 2.55
(37.33)
0.81
(23.97)
0.82
(29.46)
0.50
(9.53)
1.99
(31.52)
1.04
(28.72)
0.37
(12.23)
0.04
(0.75)
−0.35
(−6.18)
0.83
(24.92)
0.37
(9.77)
0.06
(0.99)
Up 0.33
(6.00)
−0.12
(−4.63)
0.38
(14.77)
0.73
(13.90)
−0.10
(−1.95)
0.07
(2.50)
−0.05
(−2.03)
0.23
(5.05)
1.66
(23.37)
−0.07
(−2.86)
−0.08
(−2.68)
0.19
(3.50)
Up minus down −1.85
(−33.74)
−0.54
(−19.49)
−0.25
(−11.66)
0.20
(3.82)
−1.28
(−27.60)
−0.56
(−19.63)
−0.24
(−10.32)
−0.25
(−11.66)
−1.22
(−31.14)
−0.52
(−19.54)
−0.27
(−9.71)
0.15
(2.58)
Mean quarterly abnormal returns of value-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when there is no corresponding change in sell-side analysts' consensus
recommendation (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down 2.02
(32.79)
0.57
(18.29)
0.66
(24.30)
0.08
(1.63)
−0.18
(−3.51)
0.58
(17.53)
0.54
(18.15)
−0.02
(−0.40)
−0.43
(−7.74)
0.53
(17.55)
0.24
(6.55)
−0.08
(−1.36)
Up −0.05
(−0.88)
−0.37
(−14.71)
0.29
(11.37)
−0.00
(−0.04)
1.83
(30.92)
−0.39
(−14.70)
0.18
(6.46)
−0.14
(−3.21)
1.44
(22.72)
−0.42
(−16.10)
−0.07
(−2.12)
−0.21
(−4.17)
Up minus down −1.75
(−23.49)
−0.56
(−20.48)
−0.21
(−9.72)
−0.08
(−1.60)
−1.32
(−26.37)
−0.57
(−20.59)
−0.19
(−8.22)
−0.09
(−1.70)
−1.17
(−30.51)
−0.55
(−21.23)
−0.18
(−6.15)
−0.09
(−1.46)
Panel C: Mean quarterly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when the sell-side consensus analyst recommendation
simultaneously changes in the same direction (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down −1.26
(−23.08)
−0.43
(−15.34)
−0.69
(−30.90)
0.23
(6.33)
−1.56
(−29.48)
−0.32
(−11.75)
−0.94
(−40.26)
−0.21
(−5.78)
−1.64
(−29.00)
−0.52
(−20.22)
−0.50
(−17.27)
−0.10
(−2.40)
Up 2.47
(46.92)
0.91
(35.30)
0.83
(38.51)
0.47
(13.14)
2.09
(41.63)
0.98
(35.77)
0.60
(26.43)
0.26
(7.72)
1.84
(33.21)
0.84
(30.91)
0.60
(22.31)
0.10
(2.53)
Up minus down 3.59
(46.23)
0.94
(30.57)
1.09
(43.36)
0.24
(5.87)
3.52
(45.78)
0.94
(30.13)
1.11
(41.47)
0.47
(11.17)
3.36
(41.08)
0.97
(31.94)
0.80
(27.12)
0.24
(5.18)
Table 4 (continued)
Panel C: Mean quarterly abnormal returns of equally-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when the sell-side consensus analyst recommendation
simultaneously changes in the same direction (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Mean quarterly abnormal returns of value-weighted portfolios upgraded/downgraded by buy-side analysts when the sell-side consensus analyst recommendation simultaneously
changes in the same direction (%) (t-statistic)
CAPM abnormal return Fama–French abnormal return Carhart abnormal return
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Quarterly First
month
Last
month
Next
quarter
Down −1.22
(−24.82)
−0.09
(−3.75)
−0.77
(−35.19)
0.08
(2.18)
−1.16
(−23.69)
−0.14
(−5.19)
−0.63
(−27.30)
−0.03
(−0.91)
−1.39
(−25.90)
−0.21
(−8.22)
−0.42
(−14.17)
0.23
(5.63)
Up 1.46
(32.90)
0.59
(24.60)
0.58
(29.22)
−0.19
(−5.50)
1.34
(30.20)
0.57
(22.60)
0.70
(31.95)
−0.10
(−2.97)
1.22
(24.60)
0.55
(21.99)
0.75
(28.27)
−0.35
(−9.19)
Up minus down 2.58
(39.60)
0.50
(18.88)
0.95
(41.56)
−0.23
(−5.41)
2.41
(37.18)
0.52
(18.88)
0.95
(39.03)
−0.03
(−0.71)
2.52
(35.39)
0.56
(20.61)
0.83
(29.59)
−0.50
(−10.29)
8 We concentrate on this benchmark owing to the importance of momentum in return
persistence.
9 For robustness we used equally-weighted portfolios and found similar results. Fordifferences could be attributed to the characteristics of the stocks held by
the institutions too. In this section of the analysis we examine a total of
five variables: portfolio size, portfolio turnover, analyst coverage, analyst
forecast dispersion, and the percentage of stock held by institutions. The
last three variables arewith respect to the attributes of the stocks held by
the institutions.
Table 5 reports the time-seriesmeans of coefficients computed from
quarterly regressions of buy-side institutions' abnormal returns of
value-weighted portfolios formed by going long on upgraded and
short on downgraded stocks.6 We calculate these abnormal returns
using the Carhart (1997) four factor model that includes momentum
in addition to the Fama–French three factor model and regress those
returns on several variables in a multiple regression setting. We find
that both portfolio size and portfolio turnover, where significant, relate
positively to abnormal returns. Thus it appears that analysts in certain
types of institutions (e.g. mutual funds, brokerage houses) who work
with larger investment portfolios are more profitable than analysts in
the same types of institutions who work with smaller portfolios. Addi-
tionally,withinmost types of institutions, analystswhomore frequently
change their recommendations are usually more profitable than those
who do not.
Within most institution-types, including ‘other’ institutions,7 stocks
covered by more analysts yield higher abnormal returns than do stocks
covered by fewer analysts, and stocks with a low degree of dispersion in
earnings forecasts outperform stocks with a high degree of dispersion.
Within banks and brokerage firms, stocks that are to a larger extent
held by institutions outperform stocks that are not. Looking across all in-
stitutions, most of these variables relate significantly to excess return.
The intercept is significant and negative for the full sample and is the
most negative and significant for the subsamples of brokerage firms,
banks, andother institutions. This suggests (sample size differences not-
withstanding) that the bulk of the institutional underperformance that
we documented earlier is concentrated within these groups.
4. Persistence
It has been established that sell-side analysts not only generate prof-
itable recommendations but also that the more successful analysts
show persistence in their performance (see Mikhail, Walther, and6 We also computed resultswith equally-weighted portfolios and obtained similarfind-
ings. For the sake of brevity we do not report those results here.
7 The ‘other’ category includes university endowments, foundations, hedge funds, and
other institutions that cannot be classified as banks, insurance firms, brokerage firms, or
mutual funds.Willis (2004), and Li (2005)). On the other hand, buy-side analysts' per-
sistence is not very clear even though buy-side investment performance
has been the subject of many studies. Most of the larger, more compre-
hensive studies find that buy-side trading yields negative or at best in-
significant abnormal returns, while some recent studies using smaller
datasets have found institutional investing to be profitable in at least
some cases. Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) find little evidence of
persistence, particularly when they go beyond the three-factor model
to calculate abnormal returns.
We examine the possibility of buy-side analyst persistence by first
segmenting our sample of institutions that employ these analysts into
deciles based on the most recent year's abnormal returns (calculated
using the Carhart (1997) four factor model including momentum).8
The deciles are based on value-weighted9 zero-investment (long-
minus-short i.e. upgraded-minus-downgraded) portfolios of stocks for
which the sell-side analysts' consensus recommendation simultaneous-
ly changed in the opposite direction. As we mentioned earlier, we focus
on these stocks because they represent clear cases of disagreementwith
the sell-side and thus are the stocks most likely to have been traded
based on the recommendations of their institutions' own (i.e. buy-
side) analysts.
We then look ahead to see what each decile's four-factor abnormal
return is over alternately the next quarter, the next year, and the next
two years.10 We report the time-series means of the subsequent quar-
terly, one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead returns in Table 6. The first
column in the table shows that there is considerable disparity between
our groups; excess returns over the past year range from an average of
−0.625% for the lowest decile to 0.16% for the top decile. Additionally,
there is ample evidence of persistence. Whether we measure excess
returns one quarter, one year, or two years ahead, they increase mono-
tonically with the pre-period performance decile. Additionally, the
difference between the bottom and top deciles (“D10 minus D1”) is
everywhere negative and highly significant. Given that the excess
returns shown in Table 6 are based on the Carhart (1997) model, we
can say that we find strong evidence of persistence, both overall and
cross-sectionally, for buy-side analysts and that this persistence extendsbrevity we do not report them here.
10 The abnormal return is calculated by regressing the excess returns of equally-
weighted portfolios of upgraded minus downgraded stocks on the four factors in Carhart
(1997) as shown in Section 2.3. The intercept plus the residual in each quarter equals the
abnormal return for that quarter. The quarterly return is compounded from monthly
returns.
Table 6
Persistence of buy-side analyst profitability.
This table shows buy-side analysts' persistence in profitability. We examine only those
stocks forwhich both buy-side and sell-side analysts provide coverage and hold divergent
opinions in a quarter i.e. buy-side analysts' institutions buy (sell) when sell-side analysts
downgrade (upgrade) the stock. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1994 to
the last quarter of 2009. We infer buy-side analysts' recommendations from the changes
in quarterly institutional holding data for each manager reported in 13F as detailed in
the text. We extract sell-side analyst data from the IBES detailed recommendation files.
To determine whether a stock was upgraded or downgraded by sell-side analysts in a
quarter, we compute the change in the consensus recommendation at the end of each
quarter by averaging all analysts' outstanding recommendations that are less than one
year old. We obtain quarterly excess returns by regressing the equally-weighted and val-
ue-weighted excess returns of each institution's upgraded/downgraded stocks on the
Carhart four-factor returns downloaded from Kenneth French's website. The intercepts
from these regressions plus the residual are the abnormal returns in the quarter. Yearly
abnormal returns are monthly abnormal returns compounded. We sort buy-side analysts
into 10 groups based on the past year's abnormal returns. We report the time-series
means of the subsequent quarterly, one-year, and two-year returns.
Abnormal future returns for equally-weighted portfolio deciles based on abnormal
past returns
Decile Past year
abnormal
return
(t-statistic)
Next quarter
abnormal
return
(t-statistic)
Next year
abnormal
return
(t-statistic)
Next 2 years
abnormal
return
(t-statistic)
D1
(Least profitable)
−0.6247
(−37.29)
−0.1205
(−16.39)
−0.3799
(−27.12)
−0.5653
(−36.21)
D2 −0.4303
(−32.24)
−0.0948
(−18.79)
−0.3185
(−25.78)
−0.5072
(−31.79)
D3 −0.3442
(−29.38)
−0.0816
(−18.60)
−0.2776
(−25.45)
−0.4587
(−31.40)
D4 −0.2848
(−26.93)
−0.0734
(−17.12)
−0.2519
(−24.88)
−0.4211
(−29.68)
D5 −0.2373
(−24.79)
−0.0659
(−15.87)
−0.2248
(−22.54)
−0.3882
(−26.34)
D6 −0.1941
(−22.33)
−0.0583
(−16.34)
−0.2067
(−23.04)
−0.3611
(−26.44)
D7 −0.1499
(−19.34)
−0.0527
(−15.14)
−0.1898
(−20.74)
−0.3325
(−24.29)
D8 −0.0991
(−14.79)
−0.0470
(−12.23)
−0.1659
(−18.91)
−0.2955
(−22.07)
D9 −0.0309
(−6.13)
−0.0411
(−8.98)
−0.1393
(−15.57)
−0.2503
(−17.81)
D10
(Most profitable)
0.1605
(24.84)
−0.0268
(−4.37)
−0.0834
(−6.46)
−0.1404
(−7.17)
D10 minus D1 −0.7852
(−43.73)
−0.0937
(−9.79)
−0.2965
(−15.57)
−0.4249
(−16.97)
***,**,* denote statistical significance better than 1%, 5%, and 10% using two-tailed t-statis-
tics respectively.
Table 5
Regressions of buy-side recommendation changes-based long–short portfolio's quarterly.
Abnormal returns on portfolio and stock characteristics.
This table shows buy-side analysts' portfolios' abnormal performance relative to portfolio characteristics. We examine only those stocks for which buy-side analysts' institutions buy (sell)
when sell-side analysts downgrade (upgrade). The sample period is from thefirst quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2009.We infer buy-side analysts' recommendations from changes in
quarterly institutional holding data for each manager reported in 13F as detailed in the text. We extract the sell-side analyst data from the IBES detailed recommendation files. To deter-
mine whether a stock was upgraded or downgraded by sell-side analysts in a quarter, we compute the change in the consensus recommendation by averaging all analysts' outstanding
recommendations that are less than a year old.We regress the equally-weighted and value-weighted excess returns of each institution's upgraded/downgraded stocks on the Carhart four-
factor, Fama–French three-factor andmarket excess returns, all downloaded fromKenneth French'swebsite. The intercepts from these regressions plus the residual is the abnormal return
in the quarter.We then regress these abnormal returns on stock and portfolio characteristics.We compute portfolio turnover per the CRSPfiles, analyst coverage as the number of analysts'
estimates for annual earnings at the start of each quarter (IBES summary files), analyst dispersion as the standard deviation of analysts' annual earnings estimates at the start of each
quarter divided by the price on the previous trading day, and institutional holding as the percentage of stocks held by all institutions at the start of each quarter as shown in the 13-F files.
The figures reported below are the time-series means of quarterly cross-sectional regressions.
Time-series mean of cross-sectional regression coefficients across sample-period quarters
Variables All institutions Banks Insurance firms Mutual funds Brokerage firms Others
Intercept −17.776*** −8.170*** −3.517 −4.746 −18.032*** −14.430***
Portfolio size 3.107—E11*** 4.485—E11*** −7.439—E11 1.340—E11*** 3.716—E11*** 7.630—E11***
Portfolio turnover 0.004*** −0.001 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.008*** −0.002
Analyst Coverage 0.347*** 0.107** 0.102* 0.013 0.326*** 0.443***
Analyst dispersion −11.131*** −162.517 −64.835*** −45.803*** −17.821** −29.440***
Institutional Holding 0.106*** 0.058** −0.051 −0.012 0.113*** 0.018
Average number of obs. quarter 1519 142 54 67 909 305beyond momentum. Thus overall our results imply that even though a
typical buy-side analyst does not increase their institutions' returns,
there nevertheless is cross-sectional variation across analysts in terms
of the type of institution they work for and the persistence of their
performance.5. Conclusions
To date, the literature on buy-side analyst performance, especially as
it relates to sell-side analyst performance, ismixed.Most of the compre-
hensive studies of mutual funds find either negative or statistically
insignificant abnormal returns. Several recent studies of buy-side ana-
lysts who work for mutual funds, however, find positive abnormal
returns containing value incremental to that which is provided by sell-
side recommendations. This discrepancy could owe to the different
datasets used in these studies (many of the more recent studies use
limited samples of proprietary data), the inherent differences between
mutual funds and other institutions, or other factors.
This study attempts to help fill in these gaps by examining a more
comprehensive dataset of both institutional and analyst activities to
determine the simultaneous behavior of buy-side and sell-side analysts
and the performance of the portfolios based on their recommendations.
We also examine the potential effect of portfolio characteristics on con-
temporaneous excess returns as well as the persistence in buy-side
performance.
We report the following results. First, portfolios formed on the basis
of analyst recommendations have negative contemporaneous excess
returns for the buy-side and positive contemporaneous excess returns
for the sell-side. Second, when we examine and compare three catego-
ries of recommendations of buy-side analysts: (1) when sell-side
analysts concurrently change recommendations in accordance with
the institutional trade, (2)when sell-side analysts do not change recom-
mendations, and (3) when sell-side analysts give recommendations op-
posite to buy-side analysts' recommendations, we find that only when
institutions go along with sell-side analysts' recommendations do they
increase the abnormal returns to their portfolios, and that institutional
returns are lowest when they go against sell-side recommendations.
The returns are for the most part evenly distributed throughout the
three months of the quarter, suggesting that on balance institutional
trading is unprofitable, and the results do not materially change when
we examine the following quarter in addition to the quarter in which
the trade took place. Third, buy-side analysts working for large
institutions tend to perform better and are associatedwith greater port-
folio turnover, presumably because they take advantage of short-term
information as documented in the institutional literature. Fourth, even
though buy-side analysts on average do not generate positive excess
returns, they nevertheless show persistence in performance over the
next one to two years. Overall, this study offers more comprehensive
evidence on the relative contribution of buy-side and sell-side analysts
to the performance of institutions as a whole.
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